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INTRODUCTION 
 
[1]  This work is a critical review of the literature on patentable subject 
matter.  It examines the central feature of modern patent law—the 
“invention”—at an international and comparative level.  As with most 
codified terms intended to have wide-ranging, prospective applicability, it 
is usually left undefined, or if defined, is usually drafted broadly and 
permissively.  Despite the hallmarks of patentability (namely, novelty, 
inventiveness, and industrial applicability), some courts1 and academic 
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1 See Biogen Inc. v. Medeva Plc, 112 R.P.C. 25 (1995) (U.K.); Genentech Inc.’s Patent, 
106 R.P.C. 147 (1989) (U.K.).  But see Biogen Inc. v. Medeva Plc, 114 R.P.C. 1 (1997) 
(U.K.). 
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commentators2 have questioned whether there still needs to be an 
invention in the first place, before one even considers its patentability.  
 
[2]  The following sections have been structured as follows.  Parts I and II 
provide an overview and early history of patentable subject matter.  Part 
III examines various subject matter which seem immune to patentability – 
laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas. Part IV addresses 
the tools of basic research.  Within this section, there appears to be a long-
standing reluctance against the monopolization of these types of subject 
matter.  I have folded some of my discussions regarding biotechnological 
innovations into this subsection, since some advances in biotechnology 
can reasonably be viewed as involving or uncovering the tools of basic 
research.  
 
[3]  Part V illustrates the internationalization of “invention” and patent-
eligible subject matter through the standard-setting agenda of TRIPS.3  
Indeed, the literature in this field is generally divided between authors who 
look at the concept of invention from an international perspective under 
TRIPS, rather than an Americentric point of view.  TRIPS has become the 
focal point for many Commonwealth4 scholars since it is administered by 
the WTO and sets out minimum standards for most forms of intellectual 
property, and ratification of it is therefore a mandatory requirement for 
membership in the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) “game” (at least 
as of 1994, following the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade).5 
 
[4]  The remaining sections, Parts VI, VII, and VIII, deal with patenting 
intangible inventions (business methods, software, signals, and even 
sporting techniques), and the role (if any) that policy and ethics ought to 
                                                 
2 See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (arguing that TRIPS has articulated a 
subject matter threshold followed by the aforementioned hallmarks of patentability). 
3 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal 
Instruments – Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].   
4 The Commonwealth is an intergovernmental, multilateral organization of countries with 
historical constitutional links to Britain.  See Foreign Affairs and International Trade 
Canada, Canada and the Commonwealth, http://www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/commonwealth/index.aspx (last visited Oct. 26, 2008).   
5 TRIPS, supra note 3. 
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play in determining subject matter eligibility.  The problems that 
biotechnological advances present to the concept of “invention” resurface 
in the section on ethics and subject matter eligibility, especially in relation 
to human-animal chimeras, and life forms that are genetically approximate 
to humans. 
 
I.  OVERVIEW & ASSUMPTIONS ON PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER 
 
[5]  Professor Vaver provides an overview of how the notion of invention 
is presently interpreted under Commonwealth patent laws, by using TRIPS 
as his starting point.6  Article 27.1 of TRIPS provides that “patents shall 
be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields 
of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and 
are capable of industrial application,”7 with little more as to what qualifies 
as an invention. Indeed, the only exceptions to patentability under TRIPS 
are those necessary to protect any of the following: ordre public or 
morality; diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of 
humans or animals; plants and animals other than microorganisms, and in 
essence biological processes for the production of plants or animals other 
than non-biological and microbiological processes.8  These exceptions, 
however, are neither absolute nor required; TRIPS states that Member 
States “may” exclude these from patentability, but they are not required to 
do so.9  
 
[6]  Vaver rightly notes that WTO trade panels have become a major 
vehicle used to control the meaning of “invention” at an international 
level.  Signatories to TRIPS, although permitted to expand their “range of 
items for which patents are granted,” may not “through legislation or 
judicial decision, restrict the meaning of invention . . . . [As] the WTO 
may, through its dispute resolution procedures, require the offender to 
discard any unacceptably narrow meaning of invention or any 
unacceptably broad interpretation of a permissible exception.”10  
                                                 
6 David Vaver, Invention in Patent Law: A Review and a Modest Proposal, 11 INT’L J.L. 
& INFO. TECH. 286, 289-90 (2003). 
7 TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 27.1. 
8 Vaver, supra note 6, at 290. 
9 Id. at 301. 
10 Id. 
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Furthermore, Vaver remarks that there seems to be a trend towards the 
reduction of the exceptions to patentability.11  Aside from common law 
trends, Vaver notes that many bilateral treaties (concluded either in 
response to, or to augment, existing obligations under TRIPS – so-called 
“TRIPS-plus” treaties) have the effect of further relaxing restrictions to 
patentability to the benefit of one of the parties to that treaty.  This 
relaxation of restrictions may in turn “have multilateral effects because 
TRIPs requires any advantage extended by one WTO member to another 
to be extended to all.”12 
 
[7]  Although I agree with Vaver’s views on the use of TRIPS to globalize 
and control the meaning of “invention,” he does proffer some 
controversial (and certainly, far from modest)13 claims and suggestions for 
reform. Vaver writes that:  
 
Patents should work manifestly in the public benefit – the 
ultimate justification for the system. The public pays a high 
price for patents. . . . Therefore the legislation should be 
amended to exclude inventions that it would not be in the 
public interest to patent – in effect, a return to the principle 
of excluding “generally inconvenient” patents, but one 
where the issue of “convenience” or “public interest” is 
seriously weighed and considered.14  
 
Vaver even argues that special ethics and public interest panels be 
established, independent of the patent offices around the world, to decide 
whether a particular invention qualifies as patentable subject matter.15  
Perhaps this is where Vaver’s suggestions may have gone too far.  In 
                                                 
11 Id. 
12 TRIPS represents a relaxation of the patentability restrictions, however, “TRIPS-plus” 
treaties narrow requirements even further.  See TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 4; Vaver, supra 
note 6, at 302 (emphasis omitted).  
13 Although, it is likely that Vaver was making a guised reference to Jonathan Swift’s 
book.  See generally JOHN SWIFT, A MODEST PROPOSAL: FOR PREVENTING THE 
CHILDREN OF POOR PEOPLE IN IRELAND FROM BEING A BURDEN TO THEIR PARENTS OR 
THE COUNTRY, AND FOR MAKING THEM BENEFICIAL TO THE PUBLIC (1729) (suggesting 
that poor Irish children be sold to the gentry as food). 
14 Vaver, supra note 6, at 305. 
15 Id. at 306-07. 
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particular, his suggestion that patents should work to the public’s benefit 
appears inconsistent with the nature of a patent as a negative right.  His 
suggestion to establish an “Ethics and Public Interest Panel,”16 which 
would be independent from the patent offices, neither defines patentable 
subject matter nor helps one to find relevant examples of inventions that 
qualify.  Independent panels are often anything but independent.  The 
“public interest” (assuming that patents ought to serve the public interest 
in the first place) becomes the “panel’s interest,” it reflects the vested 
interests and influences of the panel.  The introduction of a special “Ethics 
and Public Interest Panel” would likely add another layer of complexity 
and uncertainty to the patent race. 
 
[8]  Indeed, Richard Gold has recently written on many of the assumptions 
upon which the patent system is built – namely, patents as ethically 
neutral, negative rights which encourage research and dissemination of 
knowledge.17  Gold, perhaps intentionally, challenges the Americentric, 
capitalist view that patents are necessary to promote and encourage 
research and economic growth.18  He systematically demonstrates that 
patents are neither necessary to provide an incentive to innovate, nor are 
they the optimal policy tool for stimulating and sustaining research and 
development.19   
 
[9]  Gold also deals with the assumption that patents are ethically neutral.  
He argues that the ethical neutrality of patents is “assumed by the 
literature and jurisprudence.”20  He characterizes the assumption as 
follows: 
 
Were ethical review a necessary criterion for patentability 
(as opposed to an ancillary regulatory concern), so this 
                                                 
16 Id. at 306.  
17 See generally E. Richard Gold, et al., The Unexamined Assumptions of Intellectual 
Property: Adopting an Evaluative Approach to Patenting Biotechnological Innovation 
(European Univ. Inst. Working Paper RSCAS No. 2004 /45, 2004), available at 
http://www.iue.it/RSCAS/WP-Texts/04_45.pdf (highlighting the assumptions upon 
which intellectual property issues are structured). 
18 Id. at 23. 
19 See id. at 2-10. 
20 Id. at 14. 
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argument goes, it would jeopardize the ostensible neutrality 
of the patent system which otherwise coordinates the 
simultaneous and contradictory objectives of achieving 
maximum levels of innovation and access to the products 
of innovation.21   
 
Gold acknowledges that this assumption is somewhat tenuous, especially 
in considering that property is power and that control over significant 
biotechnological resources is being delegated to the private sector on an ad 
hoc, first-come, first-served basis; control is disbursed one patent at a 
time.22  Gold sums up these assumptions neatly: 
 
Together, they lead to a policy of relying on the patent 
system to encourage most research.  But as the patent 
system provides a reward for commercial products and 
processes and not for the acquisition of basic knowledge, 
the combination of these assumptions leads to an over-
emphasis on applied, as opposed to basic, research. 
Although such an approach may be economically 
favourable in the short term, it threatens longer-term 
sustainability and economic competitiveness.23 
 
[10]  Later in his work (after constructing a solid and uncontroversial 
framework, like Vaver), Gold proposes what he labels a “compelling 
alternative,” namely, the evaluation of intellectual property (patents in 
particular) through the use of transdisciplinary probes.24  His proposal is 
weakened by the ambitious goal of replacing one paradigm of how patents 
are granted and construed with another (similar to Vaver’s suggestions for 
reform).  Gold’s transdisciplinary probes also assume that the involvement 
of other fields of inquiry into the patenting process would somehow 
alleviate administrative burden, and indeed, it assumes some level of 
congruence and agreement among those “transdisciplines.”  Ironically, 
Gold’s transdisciplinary probes need their own assumptions examined. 
                                                 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 15. 
23 Id. at 19. 
24 Id. at 20-31. 
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II.  HISTORICAL VIEWS ON PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER 
 
[11]  While the previous section provided a brief overview of patentable 
subject matter as it stands today, the following section provides an 
overview of how patentable subject matter has been cast historically.  The 
statutory basis for modern patent law originated in Italy under the 
Venetian Statute of 1474.25  English patent law did not find a statutory 
basis until the Statute of Monopolies in 1623. 26 
 
[12]  Many scholars have examined the early jurisprudence following the 
enactment of the Statute of Monopolies to distil how earlier Courts had 
viewed patentability and patentable subject matter.  Justine Pila however, 
provides a new twist on these views. She provides a historical account of 
how inherently patentable subject matter was viewed by the Courts before 
the Statute of Monopolies (which again, gave rise to the modern patent 
system in so far as it is used throughout the Commonwealth).27  Pila notes 
that:  
 
[there] has been a tendency to treat the Statute of 
Monopolies as having given rise to a new body of law, 
rather than given legislative form to an existing 
jurisprudence. This tendency—first recognised by E 
Wyndham Hulme in 1896—continues to be particularly 
problematic in countries (such as Australia and New 
Zealand) in which the meaning of “invention” still derives 
expressly from the Statute of Monopolies, and in other 
common law countries that continue to rely on 
                                                 
25 See Ikechi Mgbeoji, The Juridical Origins of the International Patent System: Towards 
a Historiography of the Role of Patents in Industrialization, 5 J. Hist. Int’l L. 403, 413 
(2003).  The statutory basis for modern patent law can be traced to Italy, this is not to say 
that patent ‘systems’ themselves have strictly Italian roots).  Mgbeoji, for instance, has 
traced patents systems to the Andaman Islanders, the Kai, the Koryak and the Plains 
Indians.  Id. at 406. 
26 Justine Pila, The Common Law Invention in Its Original Form 8-9 (Univ. of Melborne 
Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 18, 2001), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=270909. 
27 Id. at 2-9. 
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jurisprudence said to originate with the Statute of 
Monopolies to explicate their own patent legislation.28 
 
[13]  The Statute of Monopolies was merely the legislative response to an 
existing body of jurisprudence and royal prerogative concerning the grant 
of letters patent.29  It was not until 1601 that the Crown lost its exclusive 
jurisdiction over letters patent, allowing the common law courts to weigh 
in on the matter for the first time.30  
 
[14]  In Darcy v. Allin, the Court of the King’s Bench held that Her 
Majesty’s 1598 grant of a monopoly over the manufacture, sale, and 
import of playing cards was invalid, since it amounted to granting a 
monopoly over an existing trade, as opposed to a new trade (or 
invention).31  Likewise in the Clothworkers of Ipswich case,32 the Court 
held that: 
 
[I]f a man hath brought in a new invention and a new trade 
within the kingdom . . . or if a man hath made a new 
discovery of any thing . . . [the King] may grant by charter 
unto him, that he only shall use such a trade or trafique for 
a certain time . . . but when that patent is expired, the King 
cannot make a new grant thereof: for when the trade is 
become common, and others have been bound apprentices 
in the same trade, there is no reason that such should be 
forbidden to use it.33 
 
[15]  Pila therefore notes that the only subject matter which generally 
qualified for patentability were entire trades or devices.34  The mere 
addition to a trade or device, or anything derivative of such trades or 
                                                 
28 Id. at 1.  
29 Id. at 7 n.64 (“The 1601 debate in Parliament focused on a bill entitled ‘An Act for the 
Explanation of the Common Law in Certain Cases of Letters Patent’ which clarified the 
common law limits of the Crown’s power to grant monopolies.”). 
30 Id. at 7-8.  
31 (1603) 74 Eng. Rep. 1131 (K.B.). 
32 (1615) 78 Eng. Rep. 147 (K.B.). 
33 Id. at 148. 
34 Pila, supra note 26, at 10. 
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devices, would not qualify as patentable subject matter.35  Although Pila’s 
observations are insightful from a historical perspective, the Statute of 
Monopolies no longer forms the basis for the Patent Acts of Canada, nor 
for the U.S., nor the U.K. (the latter being harmonized with the European 
Patent Convention).  So while Pila’s observations might be pertinent to 
New Zealand or Australian patent law, they lie beyond the bounds of this 
work. Furthermore, early jurisprudence often reflects the priorities and 
interests of the Courts at those times; it does not necessarily tell us how a 
statute is to be read or interpreted in today’s world.  Patentable subject 
matter may have been restricted to new inventions or new trades “as a 
whole” because of the relative scarcity or unavailability of information as 
to true novelty or rightful ownership.  A pragmatic scheme was devised 
which would only grant patents for such macro-categories.  
 
[16]  In other writings, however, Pila notes that much of the excluded 
subject matter from American jurisprudence (namely, laws of nature, 
natural phenomena and abstract ideas)36 are actually mirrored within the 
Commonwealth’s exclusions to patentability as well.37  Such underlying 
similarities suggest an international coherence in patent law existed well 
before the standard-setting agenda of TRIPS.  It is this “unholy” and 
unpatentable trinity of excluded subject matter that form the bulk of the 
American writings on patent-eligible subject matter.  
 
III.  THE UNHOLY AND UNPATENTABLE TRINITY – LAWS OF NATURE, 
NATURAL PHENOMENA AND ABSTRACT IDEAS38 
 
[17]  Michael Meehan notes that despite the expansive wording of the U.S. 
Patent Statute, it has nonetheless been “well established” in jurisprudence 
that mathematical algorithms, laws of nature, natural phenomena, and 
                                                 
35 See id. at 11. 
36 See Justine Pila, Inherent Patentability in Anglo-Australian Law: A History, 14 AUSTL. 
INTELL. PROP. J. 109, 140-41, 163 (2003), available at 
http://users.ox.ac.uk/~lawf0169/papers/inhpathistory.pdf  
37 See generally id. at 109 (discussing the evolution of judicial constructions of inherent 
patentability). 
38 Throughout this work, I shall refer to laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract 
ideas as either the “unholy trinity,” or the “unholy and unpatentable trinity.” 
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abstract ideas cannot be patented.39  He notes that the U.S. Supreme Court 
has consistently held that such discoveries “are not the kind of 
‘discoveries’ that the statute was enacted to protect.”40 
 
[18]  Meehan raises an interesting point, which he argues against 
vigorously later in his paper, that perhaps, 
 
One might argue that the limited monopoly provided by the 
patent system should reward those who discover useful new 
mathematical algorithms, unknown laws of nature, new 
scientific facts, and novel abstract ideas. Perhaps one 
should be given the reward (ex post) or incentive (ex ante) 
of a patent monopoly in exchange for the effort involved.41 
 
Meehan raises this argument in the context of examining the Federal 
Circuit’s appellate decision in Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. v. Laboratory 
Corp. of America Holdings.42  That case involved the licensing of a 
patented method of testing homocysteine levels in body fluids, while the 
patent at issue specifically sought to protect the scientific connection 
between homocysteine levels and vitamin deficiency.43  From 1992 to 
1998, Metabolite sublicensed this patent to Laboratory Corp. (“LabCorp”) 
in exchange for a royalty stream.  After 1998, however, LabCorp began 
using another test developed by Abbott Laboratories and discontinued 
royalty payments to Metabolite.44  At the district court level, the trial jury 
found that LabCorp breached its contract with Metabolite, and that the 
                                                 
39 Michael Meehan, The Handiwork of Nature: Patentable Subject Matter and Laboratory 
Corporation v. Metabolite Labs, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 311, 312 (2006). 
40 Id. at 312-13 (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978)). 
41 Id. at 313. 
42 370 F.3d 1354 (2004). 
43 B vitamins facilitate the metabolism of homocysteine, an amino acid. The patent 
licensed to Metabolite explains a two-step method for testing for homocysteine (an amino 
acid); and then correlating the level with the B vitamin levels in the body.  Duke Law, 
Supreme Court Online, 
http://www.law.duke.edu/publiclaw/supremecourtonline/labvmet.html (last visited Oct. 
24, 2008).   
44 Metabolite, 370 F.3d at 1359. 
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patent claim in question was valid.45  The jury awarded damages of 
$3,652,724.61 to Metabolite for Labcorp’s breach of contract and 
$1,019,365.01 for its indirect infringement.46  The district court granted a 
permanent injunction, and doubled the infringement award because 
Labcorp wilfully infringed the patent in question.47 
 
[19]  Meehan argues that the patent licensed to Metabolite should have 
been declared invalid by the U.S. Supreme Court, since it was either a law 
of nature, or merely the discovery of “the Handiwork of Nature.”48  
Although Meehan’s demarcation here is not entirely clear, or sound, he 
argues that the patentees merely patented a method of correlating two 
events – a correlation which already existed, independent of, and 
unimproved by, their “mere” discovery of it.49 
 
[20]  Unfortunately for Meehan, after he published his piece, the Supreme 
Court, in Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite 
Laboratories, Inc., dismissed the writ of certiorari in Metabolite as being 
improvidently granted (and hence, did not address the merits of the 
case).50  Interestingly though, Justice Breyer (joined by Justice Stevens 
and Justice Souter) offered a strong dissenting opinion as to why the Court 
should not have dismissed the writ.51  Perhaps something of a vindication 
to Meehan, the dissent takes the view that the claim in question was 
indeed invalid, since it amounted to a monopoly on a scientific correlation 
– nothing more than a law of nature, or at the very least, a natural 
phenomenon.52  The dissent expressly adopted and reinforced the notion 
that the unpatentability of the unholy trinity – laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas – is a “given”; that is, the dissent assumed 
the soundness of excluding these from patent eligibility.  Although Justice 
Breyer admitted that these categories were and are often not easy to 
                                                 
45 Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, No. 99-CV-870, 2001 WL 
34778749, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 3, 2001).   
46 Id. 
47 Metabolite, 370 F.3d at 1358.   
48 Meehan, supra note 39, at 313.  Only claim 13 was at issue.  Id. at 315. 
49 Id. 
50 548 U.S. 124, 124 (2006). 
51 Id. at 124 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
52 Id. at 132, 135.   
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define, his dissent clarified that this case was “not at the boundary … 
claim 13 is invalid no matter how narrowly one reasonably interprets that 
doctrine.”53  Meehan agrees with Justice Breyer’s dissent in Metabolite; 
both posit that patents relating to basic scientific relationships and 
methods ought to be declared invalid because they are given for ineligible 
subject matter, irrespective of how guised the claim drafting may be.54 
 
[21]  In its most basic formulation, the exclusion of laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas from patentability underscores the very 
powerful argument that these are things which either exist independently 
of humans (irrespective of how useful or difficult its discovery may have 
been).  This exclusion from patentability also emphasizes that these are 
items to which one may not ascribe property rights; to do so would be 
inappropriate, unenforceable, or impractical.  Now, if we consider laws of 
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas to be the most fundamental, 
raw, or ethereal subject matter in the natural world, then, conceptually, the 
tools and methods employed by scientists in discovering them are one 
layer above that.   
 
IV. MONOPOLIZING THE TOOLS OF BASIC RESEARCH 
 
[22]  There are a growing number of scholars (primarily American) who 
contend that the basic tools or elements of scientific research ought to 
continue to be excluded from patentability.  Eileen Kane is one of these 
writers.55  Though she concedes that the “rationales for the exclusion of 
laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas cannot be described 
with precision,”56 she also writes that “[t]he absence of extensive 
justifications by the Court may speak for itself.”57 This thought is perhaps 
as equivocal a statement as is permissible in scholarship, since the absence 
of extensive justification may indicate that the Court is being arbitrary or 
circumventive.  It is precisely this reason – that there is little coherent 
                                                 
53 Id. at 135. 
54 Id. at 135-38; Meehan, supra note 39, at 312-13.  
55 Eileen Kane, Patent Ineligibility: Maintaining a Scientific Public Domain, 80 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 519 (2006). 
56 Id. at 545 (citing ROBERT S. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY,  J. PATENT LAW AND POLICY 
151 (3d ed. 2002)). 
57 Id. 
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rationale to exclude either these basic tools of research, or the unholy 
trinity – which forms the basis for my view that exceptions to patentability 
ought not to be as widely drawn as much of the jurisprudence and writings 
in the Commonwealth and America suggest. 
 
[23]  Nonetheless, Kane agrees with the Court’s view in Gottschalk v. 
Benson58 that “[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, mental 
processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are 
the basic tools of scientific and technological work.”59  For instance, she 
argues that the genetic code, which defines the relationship between DNA 
and protein, is a law of nature and anything that attempts to replace this 
law of nature erodes the legitimacy of gene patents.60  Kane states that 
advances in nanotechnology also present subject-matter-eligibility 
problems on the level of an atomic or subatomic structure, since these are 
either natural phenomena or governed by laws of nature.61   
 
[24]  In addressing precisely these two concerns, Jason Williams considers 
the challenges that proteomics (a branch of biotechnology dealing with the 
structure and function of proteins) poses to patent law.62  Williams’ 
approach is similar to Kane’s.  He stresses that there ought to be an 
available scientific commons in which the basic tools of scientific research 
and advancement are available to the scientific community, without the 
fear of infringement and litigation.63 
 
[25]  Williams traces the development and inclusion of biotechnological 
advances into the realm of patentable subject matter, and acknowledges 
that “[c]onventional patent theory completely supports a strong protection 
regime for fields that need incentives for private research and 
development.”64  He disputes that biotechnology as a whole and 
                                                 
58 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
59 Id. at 67. 
60 Kane, supra note 55, at 552. 
61 Id. at 552-53. 
62 J. Jason Williams, Protecting the Frontiers of Biotechnology Beyond the Genome: The 
Limits of Patent Law in the Face of the Proteomics Revolution, 58 VAND. L. REV. 955, 
958 (2005). 
63 See id. at 958.   
64 Id. at 985 (accepting this justification for the granting of patents without questioning it 
further, while being careful to use the phrase “conventional patent theory”). 
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proteomics in particular are unlike other areas of technology and therefore 
they defy many comparisons.65  Although such claims can be made about 
any new scientific (or other) paradigm – indeed, the same was said about 
Internet “law” barely a decade ago.  
 
[26]  Although his demarcation needs to be developed a bit further (e.g. 
that biotechnology is not technology, then but it is, then but it is not), 
Williams postulates that, much like the Orphan Drug Act66 and the 
(derelict) Semiconductor Chip Protection Act,67 a sui generis statutory 
scheme for biotechnology would better enhance research, innovation, and 
(presumably) the common good.68  Williams fails to consider how 
advances in biotechnology could be separated, either by definition or in 
practice, from other technological advances; he fails to provide a 
definition of biotechnology at all.  The expansiveness of the term becomes 
apparent if we adopt the definition of biotechnology from the United 
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity: “any technological 
application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives 
thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific use.” 69  
Indeed, there is no bright line here for Williams to draw. 
 
[27]  Yet in other writings, less radical means have been suggested as 
ways to deal with biotechnological innovations. Burton Ong, for instance, 
argues that organic innovations in particular ought to be protected by 
process patents, rather than product patents.70  He argues that if one were 
to accept a desert-based approach to patent entitlements, then patents 
ought to never be granted for organic inventions (per se), since the only 
contribution that the inventor can claim is the process through which the 
inventor realized that organic matter.71  Hence, the process ought to be 
                                                 
65 Id. at 985-86. 
66 21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-ee (1998). 
67 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1988). 
68 Cf. Williams, supra note 62, at 992 (allowing the existing patent system to remain 
intact while providing for the requisite elements of biological molecule patents). 
69 Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on Biological Diversity, 
art. 2, opened for signature, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M 818 (1992).  
70  Burton T. Ong , Patenting the Biological Bounty of Nature: Re-Examining the Status 
of Organic Inventions as Patentable Subject Matter, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 8-
9 (2004).  
71 See id. at 28. 
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patentable, but not the actual organic product since that contribution only 
extends to the means, not the ends, and this is the limit of his or her 
“desert.”72  Although Ong’s position is inviting, it still confines the 
processes, methods, and means of basic research to a patent monopoly. 
 
[28]  Nonetheless, the topic remains controversial as American scholarship 
trends away from expanding patentable subject matter to the basic 
elements or tools of research, on the grounds that they represent scientific 
or intellectual “commons.”  Peter Lee continues this tradition by arguing 
that patent law  
 
[S]pecifically prohibits the patenting of . . . natural laws, 
natural phenomena, and abstract principles on a 
‘fundamentality’ rationale; these assets enable wide 
varieties of derivative applications and are better suited for 
common ownership in the public domain where all persons 
can freely draw upon them in their innovative endeavors.73  
 
[29]  He argues that if we accept this basis (which is the prevailing 
exclusionary theory in the United States against the patentability of those 
items), then elements of biotechnology like human embryonic stem cells, 
which are patentable technologies when isolated and purified outside of 
the human organism and equally as fundamental, may facilitate the 
advancement of much of the biological sciences.74  Like Williams, the 
crux of Lee’s article is that many advances in biotechnology that are 
currently considered patentable ought not be, since those innovations form 
the basic research tools in the biological sciences.75 
 
[30]  The argument against the expansion of patentable subject matter on 
the grounds of fundamentality, as Lee puts it, will be examined in more 
                                                 
72 See id. 
73 Peter Y. Lee, Abstract, Inverting the Logic of Scientific Discovery: Applying Common 
Law Patentable Subject Matter Doctrine to Constrain Patents on Biotechnology 
Research Tools, 19 HARV. J.L. AND TECH. 79 (2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=897629.  
74 Id. at 88 (“Stem cell research promises to advance fundamental knowledge of human 
developmental biology and cell regeneration.”).  
75 See id. at 81. 
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depth in Part VI.  Yet, it may well be that advances in biotechnology are 
viewed as the tools of scientific research since the field is new and 
revolutionary.  If we accept this line of argument, then any scientific 
breakthrough that peels back another layer of “fundamentality” (which is 
what science does) will reveal that the existing layer was not truly 
fundamental after all and that awarding patents for that previously 
fundamental layer is now acceptable, ad infinitum.  
 
V. INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO INVENTION 
 
[31]  Since the mid 1990s, TRIPS has become the principal tool of 
international intellectual property standard setting.  Article 27.1 of TRIPS 
provides that “patents shall be available for any inventions, whether 
products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are 
new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.”76  
TRIPS arguably creates a subject matter threshold, as well as a 
patentability threshold—in that there must first be an “invention,” which 
in turn, will only receive patent protection once it satisfies the usual 
hallmarks of patentability (namely, novelty, inventiveness and industrial 
applicability).77  
 
[32]  The subtlety of this drafting has been addressed by writers such as 
George Wei78 and Luigi Palombi.79  Palombi’s writing on gene patents 
discusses the compatibility of TRIPS and the European Biotechnology 
Directive.80  Palombi points out that the TRIPS “invention” requirement is 
supported by many cases such as Genentech Inc.’s Patent,81 but 
undermined by other holdings, demonstrated by Lord Hoffman’s remarks 
in Biogen Inc. v. Medeva Plc.82  Lord Hoffman, dismissed the initial 
question of whether something is an “invention” as an invariably 
                                                 
76 TRIPS, supra note 3, art. 27. 
77 Luigi Palombi, Patentable Subject Matter, TRIPS and the European Biotechnology 
Directive: Australia and Patenting Human Genes, 26 U.N.S.W.L.J. 782, 782 (2003) 
(Austl.).  
78 George Wei, Inventions, Genes and Napoleonic Victories, 9 SING. ACAD. L.J. 1 (1997).  
79 Palombi, supra note 77.  
80 Id., at 782-84. 
81 Genentech Inc.’s Patent, supra note 1.  
82 Biogen Inc. v. Medeva Plc, 114 R.P.C. 1, 41-42 (1997) (U.K.). 
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“academic” consideration.83  He found that when the Court determines 
patentability, the first inquiry should not be what is an “invention”; rather, 
“[j]udges would . . . be well advised to put on one side their intuitive sense 
of what constituted an invention until they have considered the questions 
of novelty, inventiveness and so forth.”84  Wei rightly argues that this 
commonsense approach is undoubtedly the most practical way for the 
Courts to ordinarily proceed, however, there can be no doubt that there is a 
residue of cases where the issue of defining an “invention” is still very 
much alive, and not to be cursorily labelled as “academic.”85  Indeed, 
Palombi’s contention is that the European Biotechnology Directive 
actually violates TRIPS and its subtle drafting (as I have characterized 
it).86  Article 1.1 of the Directive states that: “Member States shall protect 
biotechnological inventions under national patent law. They shall, if 
necessary, adjust their national patent law to take account of the provisions 
of this Directive.”87 
 
[33]  Palombi notes that TRIPS requires all member states to consider 
inventions for patentability equally and consistently across “all fields of 
technology.”88  The Directive therefore presumes that biotechnological 
inventions are indeed inventions, and ignores the subject matter threshold 
step (or test) mandated by TRIPS and is “a direct violation of [article] 27.1 
of TRIPS.”89 Admittedly, the Directive does appear to be a violation of 
TRIPS on its face.  Palombi fails to mention, however, that the very next 
subsection of the Directive (Article 1.2) provides that “[t]his Directive 
shall be without prejudice to the obligations of the Member States 
pursuant to international agreements, and in particular the TRIPS 
Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity.”90  Therefore, the 
Directive—far from being a violation of TRIPS—now appears toothless in 
light of the fact that TRIPS is seemingly intended to take priority over it.  
                                                 
83 Id. at 42. 
84 Id. 
85 See Wei, supra note 78, at 15.  
86 Palombi, supra note 77, at 783; see also Council Directive 98/44, art. 1, 1998 O.J. (L 
213) 13 (EC). 
87 Council Directive 98/44, supra note 86. 
88 Palombi, supra note 77, at 790. 
89 See Id. (alteration in original).   
90 Council Directive 98/44, supra note 86. 
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If a subject matter threshold step (or test) is required before we consider 
the usual hallmarks of patentability, then we cannot presume that 
biotechnological innovations are inventions ab initio. 
 
VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PATENTS ON INTANGIBLES 
 
[34]  Implicitly or explicitly, a considerable portion of Parts III, IV and V, 
is devoted to the problems that biotechnology, in particular, present for 
many of the fundamental patent doctrines, and traditional exclusions from 
patentability.  The following sections break from this tradition, and 
examine the subject matter eligibility of intangibles—business methods, 
software, signals and even sporting techniques.  Next, in Part VII, I survey 
some of writings on the role that ethics play—or ought not to play—in 
demarcating patent-eligible subject matter.  I will also examine the 
emerging literature on human-animal chimeras which are inexorably tied 
to such concerns. 
 
[35]  By commenting on patents for business methods (i.e., patents 
covering methods for performing business operations), Nari Lee provides 
a comparative insight into these patents’ treatment across Japan, the U.S., 
and Europe.91  Lee traces how the courts and patent offices in those 
countries or regions have redefined the meaning of technology, and 
inventions thereof, from the context of physical instantiation (i.e., physical 
transformation) to the level of conceptual instantiation (i.e., useful 
information) in order to bring business methods within the realm of 
patentable subject matter.92 
                                                 
91 Nari Lee, Patent Eligible Subject Matter Reconfiguration and the Emergence of 
Proprietarian Norms - The Patent Eligibility of Business Methods, 45 IDEA 321, 327-28 
(2005). 
92 Patents are granted based on two substantive tests.  A “categorical test on patentable 
subject matter” and a “series of tests to ensure the validity of a specific patent” including 
the usual hallmarks of patentability “novelty, inventiveness/non-obviousness, and 
utility/industrial applicability.”  Id. at 331.   
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[36]  Lee argues that this change in institutional thinking (whether through 
the courts or the patent offices) reflects a change in philosophy from 
utilitarian instrumentalism to proprietarianism:93  
 
In this aspect, reconfiguration reflects a change in 
the normative justification of patent institution.  It is 
difficult to justify business method patenting under the 
traditional utilitarian instrumentalism . . . . The 
reconfiguration of patentable subject matter to protect the 
values created by business methods with patent property 
rules, instead of creating a new exclusionary right, could be 
characterized as proprietarian.94 
 
I disagree with this view.  Indeed, it is perhaps convenient that Lee ties 
patentability solely to utilitarian instrumentalism, and ignores that labour-
desert theory95 can, just as readily, justify patents (in general), and 
business method patents (in particular).96  There is no necessary 
movement towards proprietarianism here. 
 
[37]  With respect to software, it is common knowledge that such subject 
matter is now considered patent eligible; although it must usually produce 
some “useful, concrete and tangible result,”97 possess a technical 
character,98 or be integrated with other statutory matter (computer 
                                                 
93 Peter Drahos describes “proprietarianism” as “a creed and an attitude which inclines its 
holders towards a property fundamentalism.”  PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 201 (1996).  See Lee, supra note 91, at 351-55.   
94 Lee, supra note 91, at 358-59.  
95 See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.   
96 I am not saying that labour-desert theory is a necessarily sound or wholly satisfactory 
theory either. Rather, I am arguing that Lee simply failed to consider it in his quest to find 
proprietarianism. Lee’s work also ignores the role that policy plays in legislative attitudes 
and judicial decision-marking. It may well be that business methods are now considered a 
protected form of knowledge—whereas traditional knowledge is not—chiefly because of 
the extensive lobbying and commercial interests at play. 
97 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); AT&T v. Excel Commc’ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 
1352, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1999); State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group Inc., 
149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix 
Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
98 Although Art. 52(2) of the European Patent Convention enumerates “programs for 
computers” as outside the definition of invention, Art. 52(3) limits that exclusion by 
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implement inventions).99  Jinseok Park, in examining the software 
patenting practices across United States, European, and Japanese Patent 
Offices, notes that USPTO, EPO, and JPO have all agreed that to “merely 
automate a known human transaction process using well-known 
automation techniques [i.e., a computer-implemented business process] is 
                                                                                                                         
stating that it applies “only to the extent to which a European patent application or 
European patent relates to such subject-matter or activities as such.”  European Patent 
Office, European Patent Convention, pt. II, ch. I (July 2007), 
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/E4F8409B2A99862FC125736B0
0374CEC/$File/EPC_13th_edition.pdf.  Hence, computer software is patentable in 
Europe insofar as it produces a technical character.  Id. pt. III, ch. II, R. 42.  But the 
technical character requirement is not directed to software per se; rather, it protects 
certain concrete or “‘real world’ activities.”  Case of Vicom, T-208/84 Technical Board 
of Appeal 15 July 1986, O.J. EPO 1987/014, available at http://legal.european-patent-
office.org/dg3/biblio/t840208ep1.htm. 
99 This appears to be the current situation in Canada. Following the decision in 
Schlumberger Canada Ltd. v. Commissioner of Patents, [1981] 1 F.C. 845 (the only court 
decision in Canada to expressly deal with the patentability of software), the Manual of 
Patent Office Practice identified the subject matter which is eligible for patenting as 
follows:  
The claimed subject matter must fall in one of the recognized 
categories of art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of 
matter . . . . 
 
 . . . [C]omputer related subject matter is not excluded from 
patentability if the traditional criteria for patentability are satisfied. 
Software that has been integrated with statutory subject matter may be 
patentable. 
 
 . . . . 
 
 A claim to a method consisting only of making certain 
calculations according to certain formulae is, even if it results in useful 
information, excluded from patentability under subsection 27(8) of the 
Patent Act.  Such a method does not include an act or series of acts 
performed by some physical agent upon some physical object and 
producing in such object some change either of character or of 
condition. Furthermore, the method does not produce an essentially 
economic result relating to trade, industry or commerce . . . . 
 
CANADIAN PATENT OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT OFFICE PRACTICE 16-
3 (1998 ed., Feb. 2005). 
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not patentable.”100  The utility of this statement is entirely lost when one 
considers that any human transaction which is already known and uses 
well-known techniques would fail to meet the novelty requirements 
required for patentability irrespective of any discussion as to whether the 
subject matter itself is patentable.  So, aside from the fact that software 
generally qualifies as patent-eligible subject matter across much of the 
world, there is little other multinational conformity to be found. 
 
[38]  On the larger issue of intangible inventions and their subject matter 
eligibility, Richard Gruner examines the current boundaries of the patent 
system to determine when, if, or how they should be redrawn so as to 
“ensure that patent rights serve the same valuable functions concerning 
intangible innovations” as they have served for their earlier physical or 
mechanical counterparts.101  Gruner identifies “algorithms, scientific 
discoveries, naturally occurring items, mental steps, and printed matter” as 
subject matter traditionally beyond such boundaries.102  While the first 
three are simply restatements of the unholy trinity, I will briefly discuss 
the printed matter exclusion as it has not received any treatment in the 
literature up to this point.  
 
[39]  Informational text or images recorded on printed matter have 
generally been held unpatentable by U.S. courts.103  These courts held the 
view that merely reducing an idea, abstraction, method, or process to 
                                                 
100 Jinseok Park, Has Patentable Subject Matter Been Expanded?-A Comparative Study 
on Software Patent Practices in the European Patent Office, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office and the Japanese Patent Office, 13 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 336, 371-
72 (2005) (emphasis added); see REPORT ON COMPARATIVE STUDY CARRIED OUT UNDER 
TRILATERAL PROJECT B3B, available at 
http://www.trilateral.net/projects/other_project/business_method/. 
101 Richard S. Gruner, Intangible Inventions: Patentable Subject Matter for an 
Information Age, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 355, 355 (2002). 
102 See id. at 384. 
103 In re Rice, 132 F.2d 140 (C.C.P.A. 1942) (“It is well established in patent law that 
invention cannot rest alone in novel printing arrangement, although it may reside in some 
physical structures of printed matter.”); see also Note, The Patentability of Printed 
Matter: Critique and Proposal, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 475, 476 (1950) (“The origin of 
the printed-matter doctrine is found in the longstanding rule that abstractions, mental 
theories or business methods are not patentable subject matter.”). 
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writing did not amount to an invention.104  Even before the court in State 
Street Bank & Trust Company v. Signature Financial Group, Inc. put the 
“ill-conceived” business method exemption aside, 105 there was little 
discussion in the jurisprudence to explain why the printed matter doctrine 
existed.106  Nonetheless, an important exception to this doctrine exists 
                                                 
104 Boggs v. Robertson, 13 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 214, 214 (D.C. June 23, 1931) (“The 
authorities are uniform in holding printed matter per se to be unpatentable, i.e., where an 
idea is simply an abstraction the mere reduction of it to writing does not amount to 
invention.”). 
105 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
106 For instance, in Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 469 (2d Cir. 
1908), the Court quotes Fowler v. City of New York, 121 F. 747, 478. (2d Cir. 1903), in 
reaching its decision (“No mere abstraction, no idea, however brilliant, can be the subject 
of a patent irrespective of the means designed to give it effect.”).  Although Fowler did 
not deal with printed matter, the Hotel Security holding derived the principle that 
abstractions rendered to paper cannot be patentable.  Hotel Security, 160 F. at 469.  Many 
later cases cite to Hotel Security directly.  See., e.g., In re Dixon, 44 F.2d 881, 881 
(C.C.P.A. 1930); Guthrie v. Curlett, 10 F.2d 725, 726 (2d Cir. 1926); Moore v. United 
States, 50 Ct. Cl. 120, 126 (1915); Berardini v. Tocci, 200 F. 1021,1022 (2d Cir. 1912).  
Other cases cite cases which, in turn, cite the Hotel Security decision.  See, e.g., Boggs, 
13 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 216; In re Russell, 48 F.2d 668, 669 (C.C.P.A. 1931); Flint v. G. 
R. Leonard & Co., 27 F.2d 215, 217 (7th Cir. 1928).  Pamela Samuelson has offered two 
rationales: 
 
One reason for the “printed matter” rule may be a perception that 
although printing itself is a manufacturing process and part of the 
technological arts, the printed matter itself–and its contents, in 
particular–are not “in the technological arts,” even when about the 
technological arts. A book describing how to organize one’s work force 
in a rubber curing plant most effectively might be the product of a 
manufacturing process (i.e., the book) and it might be about a 
manufacturing process, but the content of the work would still not be 
the kind of manufacture or process traditionally considered to be 
patentable. 
Underlying the “printed matter” rule may be a perception that 
printed matter is among the set of things that are “writings” protectible 
by copyright law, not inventions in the “useful arts,” and that copyright 
law strikes the appropriate balance between protection of expression 
and nonprotection of ideas for written texts. This balance would be 
disrupted if patents were available based on the content of the “printed 
matter.” When “printed matter” has been patented, it has generally been 
in situations in which it has been integrated into some machine or 
physical structure which then supports the patent. 
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where the printed matter is somehow functionally connected to a physical 
structure or otherwise produces a functionally useful result.107  
                                                                                                                         
 
Pamela Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for 
Algorithms and Other Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1037 
n.36 (1990). 
107 The Court in Boggs summarized the law well: 
 
[T]he claims were properly refused in the Patent Office on the ground 
that the subject-matter does not come within the purview of section 
4886, Revised Statutes (35 U.S.C.A. 31). 
 
 . . . .  
 
The transfer ticket case, Cincinnati Traction Co. v. Poue, 210 
F. 443, involved in general the street-car transfer ticket in general use 
today with a coupon to be either torn off or left on to indicate a.m. or 
p.m. use of the ticket. The paper on which the printed matter appeared 
was used physically in addition to serving as a mere support for the 
printed matter. The coupon was also arranged to be punched to indicate 
dates and time of the day.  
 The scrip book case, Rand, McNally & Co. v. Exchange Scrip 
Book Co., 187 F. 984, involved a book having a series of coupons to be 
detached from a strip for use in payment of transportation calculated in 
terms of money instead of mileage coupons.  
 The Benjamin Menu Card Co. v. Rand, McNally Co., 210 F. 
285, involved a menu card consisting of a combined waiter's check, a 
cook's check, and a guest's check. . . . 
 The advertising card case, Mitchell v. International Tailoring 
Co., 170 F. 91, involved an advertising card consisting of two parts so 
designed that one of the parts could be thrown away after having served 
its purpose while the other part was designed to be kept.  The card was 
physically used in addition to its use as a support for the printed matter.  
 In each of these cases the thing involved was a physical object 
adapted to be handled and used in a certain manner due to the physical 
construction thereof; in each case the complete object was formed of a 
definite form and substance of a physical body supplemented by indicia 
disposed thereof in a particular manner to provide an actual physical 
cooperation between the body and indicia.  
 In the present case, no article comprising a definite physical 
body and structurally-related indicia is shown; but merely a system of 
lines without reference to any tangible article.  
 . . . I am of opinion that in all cases where the printed matter, 
irrespective of the material upon which it is printed, is the sole feature 
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[40]  Gruner notes that while printed matter and the unholy trinity 
continue to receive much judicial “hostility,” the acceptance of algorithms 
as patentable subject matter should suggest a general framework for 
recognizing and dealing with patentable subject matter in otherwise 
intangible inventions.108  According to Gruner, the Arrhythmia analysis: 
“whether the claimed invention as a whole is no more than the algorithm 
itself; that is, whether the claim is directed to a mathematical algorithm 
that is not applied to or limited by physical elements or process steps”109 is 
the proper analysis to apply when determining whether intangible 
inventions contain patentable subject matter or if the invention or method 
                                                                                                                         
of alleged novelty it does not come within the purview of the statute, as 
it is merely an abstract idea. But where the paper or physical body upon 
which the matter is printed is designed to be used with the printed 
matter, as by tearing apart or punching, it becomes more than an 
abstract idea but an actual physical article of manufacture within the 
terms of [the Patent Statute], and as such is patentable if it be a new and 
useful inventive concept.  
 The decisions make this distinction – that where no 
dependence exists between the printed matter and the object on which 
arranged such matter is merely an idea reduced to writing and is not a 
manufacture. 
 
Boggs, 13 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 215 (emphasis omitted) (emphasis added) (alteration in 
original) (citing Act of May 23 ,1930, ch. 312, 46 Stat. 376 (codified as amended at 35 
U.S.C. §§ 101, 161 (2000))).   
108 Gruner, supra note 101, at 396-97, 467. 
109 Arrhythmia Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 
1992). 
 
Determination of statutory subject matter has been conveniently 
conducted in two stages, following a protocol initiated by the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals in In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 197 
U.S.P.Q. 464 (C.C.P.A. 1978); modified after the Court’s Flook 
decision by In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758, 205 U.S.P.Q. 397 (C.C.P.A. 
1980); and again after the Court’s Diehr decision by In re Abele, 684 
F.2d 902, 214 U.S.P.Q. 682 (C.C.P.A. 1982).  
 
Id. 
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lacks the requisite physical significance or relevance.110  Inevitably, many 
of these concerns can be addressed by proper claim drafting.111 
 
[41]  Gruner’s analysis concludes with what he believes to be a new 
framework for encouraging innovation in intangible inventions.112  He 
argues that inventions are the products of “agency processes in which an 
inventor acts as the agent for a group of principals comprised of the 
potential users of the inventor’s discoveries.”113  Gruner misses the mark 
here.  There are too many neglected nuances in this assertion.  Granted, he 
provides a useful insight into the shift from subject matter ineligibility to 
eligibility for intangible inventions; but his suggestion that inventors are 
agents for potential users goes too far.114  This concept is foreign to patent 
law.  Inventors invent.  An “invention” is the right to exclude others.  It is 
not a right to produce or create that invention.  If inventors were seen as 
“mere” agents acting for the benefit of the “potential users,” this would 
imply that somewhere within the concept of inventorship lay a positive 
duty to produce or create that invention. 
 
[42]  In a similar vein, one would imagine that propagated signal claims – 
transient manufactured115 phenomena like electrical, optical or acoustical 
signals – ought to have presented similar problems with respect to their 
ephemerality and intangibility.  Authors, such as Kunin, Lytle,116 and 
Han,117 however, argue that as far back as 1854 the U.S. Supreme Court 
                                                 
110 See Gruner, supra note 101, at 396 (“[A]n analytic method will be patentable subject 
matter if the method is used to evaluate data or information with physical significance or 
relevance, giving the result further physical significance and practical utility.”). 
111 See generally WIPO Second International Conference on Electronic Commerce and 
Intellectual Property, Sept. 19-21, 2001, Business Method Patents and Beyond: Why 
E=mc2 Is Inherently Patentable (at least in the U.S. and Australia), 
WIPO/EC/CONF/01/SPK/3C, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/ecommerce/en/wipo_ec_conf_01/wipo_ec_conf_01_sp
k_3c.pdf (discussing the inherent patentability of abstract concepts). 
112 Gruner, supra note 101, at 467-69. 
113 Id. at 467. 
114 See id.  
115 As opposed to naturally occurring signals, these are propagated by “man.” 
116 Stephen G. Kunin & Bradley D. Lytle, Patent Eligibility of Signal Claims, 87 J. PAT. 
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 991, 994 (2005). 
117 Sam S. Han, Analyzing the Patentability of "Intangible" Yet "Physical" Subject 
Matter, 3 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, ¶ 25 (2002).  In reviewing the jurisprudence 
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upheld a patent on Samuel Morse’s telegraphy patents for his invention of 
“a new and useful improvement in the mode of communicating 
information by signals, by the application of electro-magnetism,” holding 
only the eighth claim (the exclusive use of electro-magnetism) 
unpatentable because it was overly broad.118 
 
[43]  More recently in Ex parte Rice, the USPTO’s Board of Patent 
Appeal and Interferences reversed a patent examiner’s rejection of a signal 
claim as being directed to non-statutory subject matter, holding instead 
that electromagnetic signals although “transitory and ephemeral in nature” 
are nonetheless statutory subject matter. 119  It might be a trite observation, 
but as the matter was decided by the Board of Patent Appeal and 
Interferences, it serves no precedential value.  Despite this trend towards 
patentability for signals per se, in In re Nuijten, a majority of the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that transitory, propagating signals 
fell outside the concept of an “invention” as being neither a process, 
machine, manufacture, nor composition of matter. 120 
 
[44]  Kunin and Lytle have traced the acceptance of such claims in Canada 
and Japan.  They argue that while the situation with respect to signal 
claims is unclear under the European Patent Convention, there is still an 
increasing trend towards the acceptance of such claims.121  Yet, the 
Canadian Intellectual Property Office has recently issued a practice notice 
stating that electromagnetic and acoustic signals per se do not constitute 
statutory subject matter within the definition of invention under section 2 
                                                                                                                         
with respect to algorithm patents, Han identifies that certain subject matter are excluded 
from patentability by virtue of the fact that they form the basic tools of scientific research 
and work.  He does not expressly address, however, that patents on signals per se may 
well be caught by this doctrine as well.  See Id. ¶¶ 77-85.   
118 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 62, 84 (1853). 
119 Ex parte Rice, No. 2002-1554 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 13, 2003), available at 
http://des.uspto.gov/Foia/ReterivePdf?system=BPAI&flNm=fd021554. 
120 In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  Justice Linn, dissenting in part, 
argued that “manufacture” ought to be given an expansive reading; and new, useful and 
non-obvious “man-made” signals were within its breadth as being directed towards 
statutory subject matter.  Id. at 1358.  
121 Kunin & Lytle, supra note 116, at 1000. 
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of the Canadian Patent Act.122  Neither Canadian jurisprudence, nor the 
Canadian Patent Act, provides any basis to support the Canadian 
Intellectual Property Office’s restriction (but there does appear to be an 
implicit acceptance of it in the U.S. decision in In re Nuijten).123  
 
[45]  Kunin and Lytle explain that signal claims are potentially more 
useful to patent holders than actual product claims since the patent holder 
could “sue anyone who makes, uses, offers, or sells the invention.”124  
Although this would also leave “intermediaries” like Internet service 
providers (“ISPs”) and telecommunications companies vulnerable to 
litigation since they would be making, using, and perhaps even 
inadvertently selling or offering to sell, such patented signals in their 
transmissions.125  Kunin and Lytle label such intermediaries as “innocent 
infringers” and postulate that the courts may deal with the situation in the 
same way that they have dealt with so-called “innocent infringers” in the 
context of online copyright infringement.126  Patent infringement, 
however, is a strict liability offence, and there is no concept of an 
“innocent infringer” in patent law.127  
 
[46]  Furthermore, to analogize and propose a solution from copyright law 
is tenuous at best. Consider that both copyright law and trademark law in 
the U.S. have evolved to protect parodies (though, there is no such defence 
in patent law).  So, by Kunin and Lytle’s line of argument, if I were to 
parody an invention by making an inane or obscure use of it, then I can 
perhaps avoid liability in patent law since this defence has been accepted 
in both copyright and trademark law in the U.S.  
 
[47]  Moving from tenuous to imaginative, Derek Bambauer provides 
some focus to an ill-forgotten area of patentable subject matter, the 
                                                 
122 Canadian Intellectual Property Office, Office Practice Regarding Signals (Aug. 14, 
2007), http://www.strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrksv/cipo/patents/notice_aug14_07-e.html.  
123 See In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1357 (determining whether a signal of electric potential 
or electromagnetic fields constitutes a composition of matter under patentable subject 
matter); id. 
124 Kunin & Lytle, supra note 116, at 999. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 1002. 
127 Id. 
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patenting of actual sporting techniques and rules (so called “sports 
patents”).128  His work actually builds on a brief commentary in the 
Colorado Law Review, in which Jeffery Smith argues that sports moves 
should not be considered patentable, on policy grounds,129 and on a non 
peer-reviewed publication by Robert Kunstadt who argues that the 
sporting industry is “open for savvy athletes and their agents to protect 
their innovations through patent law.”130 
 
[48]  Bambauer traces how this area is now considered patentable, despite 
the considerable doubt as to its viability in the past, and finds 
philosophical support for sports patents under the labour-desert theory 
(though he admits that sports patents fail the “utilitarian test”).131  
Bambauer proposes that many of the concerns regarding the 
monopolization of sporting techniques can be overcome by effective 
licensing, or patent pooling, and intra-league cross-licensing 
requirements.132  Capitalism is, of course, the answer.  An answer which 
holds true only if the patent owner is economically motivated; one could 
just as easily patent techniques to prevent everyone from using them.  For 
instance, it appears as though I could patent sporting techniques in the 
U.S. and, perhaps out of sheer Canadian patriotism, inter alia, prevent U.S. 
Olympic athletes from using them in their training or qualifying rounds. 
 
VII. ETHICS AND SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY 
 
[49]  The role that ethics ought to play (if any) in determinations of subject 
matter eligibility is fiercely contested in the literature, especially in light of 
the recent attempt by Stuart Newman and Jeremy Rifkin to patent a human 
animal chimera (hereafter the “Newman-Rifkin patent application”) in the 
                                                 
128 Derek Bambauer, Legal Responses to the Challenges of Sports Patents, 18 HARV. J. L. 
& TECH. 401, 402 (2005). 
129 Jeffery A. Smith, It’s Your Move—No, It’s Not! The Application of Patent Law to 
Sports Moves, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1051, 1052 (1999). 
130 Robert M. Kunstadt et al., Are Sports Moves Next in IP Law?, NAT’L L. J., May 20, 
1996, at C2. 
131 Bambauer, supra note 128, at 413, 420.   
132 Id. at 404, 429. 
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USPTO133 and the European Patent Convention’s prohibition against 
patenting inventions “the exploitation of which would be contrary to 
‘ordre public’ or morality.”134 
 
[50]  Valerie Phillips135 discusses how the Newman-Rifkin patent 
application was crafted to cover humans per se,136 but claimed only 
chimeras containing less than 50% of human genetic material.137  Phillips 
traces the origins and development of the “moral utility” doctrine in U.S. 
patent law.  The American origin of the doctrine can be traced to the 
Honorable Justice Story in Lowell v. Lewis, wherein the Honorable Justice 
stated that “[a]ll that the law requires is, that the invention should not be 
frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of 
society.”138  Phillips postulates that the doctrine, though infrequently 
invoked for nearly two centuries, may have a greater significance to 
                                                 
133 Posting of Lawrence B. Ebert to IPBiz.blogspot.com, 
http://ipbiz.blogspot.com/2005/02/newmanrifkin-effort-succeeds-patent.html (Feb. 15, 
2005).  
134 European Patent Office, European Patent Convention, pt. II, ch II, art. 53, 
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/E4F8409B2A99862FC125736B0
0374CEC/$File/EPC_13th_edition.pdf. 
135 Valerie Phillips, Half-Human Creatures, Plants & Indigenous Peoples: Musings on 
Ramifications of Western Notions of Intellectual Property and the Newman-Rifkin 
Attempt to Patent a Theoretical Half-Human Creature, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 383, 385 (2005); see also Indrė Kelmelytė, Can Living Things Be 
Objects of Patents?, 2 INT’L J. BALTIC L. 2, 4 (2005) (discussing the patentability 
requirements under the European Patent Convention, Lithuania in particular, and the 
U.S.); Alexandra MacBean, The Patentability of Human Beings: The Effect of a 
Proposed Exclusion in the Patents Act 1953, 33 VUWLR 379, 379 (2002) (Austl.) 
(discussing whether human beings ought to be patentable). 
136 In 1987, the USPTO issued amended examination guidelines which prohibited the 
patenting of humans. No statutory or jurisprudential basis was identified for such a ban. 
See Thomas L. Magnani, The Patentability of Human-Animal Chimeras, 14 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 443, 448 (1999).  
137 How much genetic material do you need to be considered human? Would it matter if 
the resulting life-form was “highly” anthropomorphic? Or sentient? These questions are, 
as yet, unanswered in the literature. 
138 Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C. Mass. 1817).  The doctrine is very much 
akin to the Article 53(a) prohibition of the European Patent Convention against 
“inventions the publication or exploitation of which would be contrary to ‘ordre public’ 
or morality.”  Jasemine Chambers, Patent Eligibility of Biotechnical Inventions in the 
United States, Europe, and Japan: How Much Patent Policy Is Public Policy, 34 GEO. 
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 223, 233 (2002). 
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assume in modern jurisprudence as it relates to biotechnological 
advances.139  Unlike writers like Guerra and Chambers (discussed below), 
Phillips believes that moral inquiries ought to play a role in subject matter 
eligibility.140 
 
[51]  Although the Newman-Rifkin patent application was abandoned in 
March of 2005, the patent application was first issued a Final Rejection by 
the USPTO in August of 2004, on the grounds that the application would 
either be, inter alia: 1) Inconsistent with the constitutional right to privacy 
– since holders of the patent would be entitled to prevent others from 
making or working the claimed invention, hence denying the actual person 
with the right to decide when, or if, to procreate; or 2) Tantamount to 
slavery (prohibited under the 13th Amendment), since patents preclude 
others from “using” the invention, and employment can be construed as a 
“use” – which “would be tantamount to involuntary servitude.141 
 
[52]  It is apparent that the USPTO took the view that even chimeras with 
less than 50% of their genetic materials originating from humans were 
nonetheless still human “enough” to justify the rejection. Even if we 
sidestep the imprecise equivocation that 1% - 49% of raw human genetic 
material is “enough” to consider something “human,” hence, worthy of 
protection under the U.S. Constitution,142 there is still the objection that 
none of the principal reasons cited by the USPTO are reasons against 
patentable subject matter eligibility per se, rather they are objections with 
respect to enforceability. 
 
[53]  Indeed, Richard Guerra believes that employing the patent system to 
solve, in whole or in part, the ethical dilemmas posed in demarcating 
between reproductive cloning and therapeutic cloning, or between the 
                                                 
139 Phillips, supra note 135, at 423. 
140 Id. at 448. 
141 United States Patent and Trademark Office - Patent Examiner’s Final Rejection, 
http://portal.uspto.gov/external/PA_1_0_15H/view/BrowsePdfServlet?objectId=DXEQQ
X7RPPOPPY2&lang=DINO (last visited Oct. 29, 2008).  The File Wrapper of the 
Newman-Rifkin patent application is available at the USPTO’s Public Patent Application 
Information Retrieval site, http://portal.uspto.gov/external/portal/pair.  See also supra 
note 133 and accompanying text.   
142 But see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) (stating in dicta that unborn foetuses 
have no rights under the U.S. Constitution).  
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stages at which we consider life to be “human,” is a questionable practice 
at best.143  Guerra believes patent law should be considered “an amoral 
vehicle for commercialization, or as an instrument of wide-ranging moral 
regulation.”144  Guerra derives support for his view from the first Patent 
Act.  He notes: 
 
[D]elineating proper subject matter was, and continues to 
be confined to meeting the novelty, non-obvious, utility, 
and enablement requirements, and nowhere within the first 
or current patent statute is there a requirement to conduct a 
moral consideration of what is contrary to public policy.145 
 
[54]  Undoubtedly, Guerra is right with respect to the strict, literal wording 
of the Act. Guerra also cites, but fails, to make the connection with the 
Lowell v. Lewis decision that suggests courts may have read the moral 
utility doctrine into the Patent Act precisely because Congress intends the 
Act to be interpreted with this gloss. 146 
 
VIII. POLICY AND SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY 
 
[55]  I have separated the role that policy plays from subject matter 
eligibility, not because policy and ethics are necessarily or always two 
different enterprises, but because the writings in this area are simply less 
concerned with ethics.  
 
                                                 
143 Richard Guerra, Comment, Therapeutic Cloning as Proper Subject Matter for Patent 
Eligibility, 43 IDEA 695, 698-99 (2003). 
144 Id. at 709.  Indeed, this “amoralization” of patent statutes is also echoed in the 
Canadian literature.  See Concetta Manera, Owning Humans and Parts Thereof: The 
Common Law History and the Recent Patent Controversies (Oct. 2001) (unpublished 
LL.M. Thesis, Queen’s University) (on file with the National Library of Canada) 
(arguing that the original goals of the Canadian Patent Act preclude any consideration of 
moral or ethical grounds for the opposition or rejection of life form patents).   At the time 
of her work’s publication, the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Harvard College v. 
Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45 (Can.), had not yet been handed 
down.  Part of the decision entertained such moral and ethical considerations. 
145 Guerra, supra note 143, at 710. 
146 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C. Mass 1817). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology  Volume XV, Issue 1 
 
32 
[56]  Consider the work of Jasemine Chambers, who writes from a 
decidedly Americentric view of patent policy and the patent eligibility of 
biotechnological inventions across the U.S., Europe, and Japan and argues 
that “[w]orldwide, U.S. patent law provides the broadest protection of 
biotechnological inventions, and significantly, the United States leads the 
world in this area in terms of advancement and research efforts.”147  It is 
not only because of patent protection that that the U.S. leads the way in 
biotechnological research, as there are a myriad of other connected factors.  
Patent eligibility may well be the least important of those; Chambers 
neither explores nor acknowledges this position.  Building on Bambauer’s 
earlier work,148 the U.S. should also be a leader in most commercially 
viable sports since it has the broadest protection for sporting techniques.  
Although the relative lack of success for the U.S. in sports such as 
soccer,149 cricket, hockey, and rugby suggests otherwise.  If Chambers’s 
thesis is taken to its logical, and not so distant conclusion, the U.S. should 
be the leader in every biotechnological field since it offers the broadest 
patent protection.  
 
[57]  Indeed, Chambers employs every single assumption identified by 
Gold150 and endeavours to show that lack of patent protection for 
biotechnological innovation would decrease research funding, decrease the 
quality of medical services, and ultimately would stifle economic 
growth.151  She notes that the European Patent Convention’s prohibition 
on inventions that contravene ordre public or morality should not be 
fostered, encouraged, or cultivated in U.S. Patent Law.152  Accordingly, 
public policy and public involvement should be left out of the patent 
eligibility question.  She is particularly wary of invoking the moral utility 
doctrine to deny patent eligibility on human animal chimeras.153  To 
Chambers, “good” patent policy would: (a) look something like U.S. 
patent policy (indeed, she devotes an entire section to the “discrepancies” 
                                                 
147 Chambers, supra note 138, at 241.  
148 See supra notes 128-132 and accompanying text. 
149 This is a reference to the sport commonly known as football in most countries, but 
commonly known as “soccer” in Canada and the United States. 
150 Gold, supra note 17. 
151 Chambers, supra note 138, at 233. 
152 Id. at 242. 
153 Id. at 242. 
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of European and Japanese patent law); and (b) be completely devoid of 
public policy concerns.154  
 
[58]  With the United States leading the way with TRIPS and its agenda of 
intellectual property standard setting, scholarship like Chambers’s ought 
make us all wary of the import of such international agreements.  Indeed, 
she asserts that “[t]he scope of patent eligible subject matter typically 
expands as a nation realizes increasing economic growth and 
industrialization,”155 without considering the role that TRIPS plays in 
coercing that ever-expanding scope.156  Additionally, through negative 
implication, Chambers suggests that countries that do not expand their 
patent eligible subject matter may become, or already are, stumped in their 
level of economic growth.157 
 
[59]  Whereas Chambers might see the U.S. as the gatekeeper for world 
patent policy and subject matter eligibility—and to some extent, she may 
be correct—David Olson believes U.S. Courts assume a lesser 
gatekeeping role in determining subject matter eligibility.158  Building on 
the concerns addressed in Meehan’s aforementioned work,159 Olson 
specifically examines the Supreme Court’s ruling in Metabolite.  In 
Olson’s view, the June 2006 dismissal of the writ of certiorari, represents 
the Supreme Court and federal courts’ trend towards a more limited  
“gatekeeping role” in establishing the scope and boundaries of patentable 
subject matter.160  
 
[60]  Tracing the “rise and fall” of the need for physical transformation, 
and the former exclusions of mental steps and business methods from 
patent eligible subject matter, Olson views the Supreme Court’s dismissal 
as exemplifying a recent tradition of abandonment of its role as a 
                                                 
154 See id. at 242, 244-45. 
155 Id. at 226. 
156 Vaver, supra note 6, at 286-307. 
157 Chambers, supra note 138, at 244. 
158 See generally David S. Olson, Taking the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: 
The Case for Restricting Patentable Subject Matter 39 (Boston Coll. Law Sch. Legal 
Studies Research Paper, Working Paper No. 163, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=933167. 
159 Meehan, supra note 39, at 315. 
160 Olson, supra note 158, at 7-8. 
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gatekeeper. Needless to say, he is keen on seeing the gatekeeper role 
revived through a new administrative agency.  
 
While Congress could take on the role of determining 
efficient subject matter itself, it is probably not the body 
best suited to the task. Congress probably does not have the 
time or the ability to focus extended attention necessary to 
come up with the best determinations of subject matter 
patentability. In addition, Congress suffers from the well-
known problems of industry capture and susceptibility to 
lobbying. 
 
A better choice probably would be for Congress to 
delegate the gatekeeper role to an administrative agency. 
An administrative agency, such as the PTO, could devote 
the time and resources necessary for thorough analysis. An 
agency could hire and/or consult with economists, industry 
members, academics, etc., so as to have a much greater 
factual and analytical framework available to it in making 
its determination than a court would typically have 
available to it from the submissions of the parties to a 
dispute.161  
 
[61]  Olson’s posture begs the question: How does more complexity 
reduce complexity?  Under this agency model, would the Courts lack 
interpretative or appellate powers with respect to patent eligible subject 
matter?  Furthermore, hiring economists, industry members and academics 
does not solve the problem that Congress faces with respect to lobbying.  
It is well-known that economists, industry members, academics—
everyone—comes to the table with their own research agendas, views, 
biases, funding, and so forth.162  Olson’s model also assumes that some 
affirmative “truth” or consensus could be achieved.  Relying on an agency 
that would likely make decisions based on a majority basis, with 
innumerable concessions along the way, is no different than the way the 
                                                 
161 Id. at 63-64. 
162 The selection process alone for such economists, industry members, and academics 
would also be subject to biases, agendas, and so forth. 
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Courts, the USPTO, or the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 
operate today.  Olson’s proposal merely compounds the problem.   
 
[62]  Leaving Olson’s problematic introduction of a specialized agency 
aside, there is still his very real concern that the Courts have indeed 
abandoned their implicit role as gatekeepers of patent eligible subject 
matter.  Samuel Oddi has a rather singular answer.163  Oddi argues that 
patent eligibility issues, in particular, ought to follow general 
jurisprudential patterns, especially given the broad, permissive language of 
patent statutes.164  In answer to Olson, he finds that   
 
There appears to be a regenerative, self-correcting 
mechanism at work over time with respect to opinions 
restricting the scope of patent eligibility.  Examples include 
. . . Benson/Flook [which is corrected] by 
Chakrabarty/Diehr/State Street.  These “regenerations” 
appear to represent repeated reversion to the policy driven 
decision making process of the formative period.165   
 
[63]  In truth, the Courts are far from abandoning their roles as gatekeeper, 
even Olson admits that this is a relatively recent state of affairs; the Courts 
may simply be unconsciously caught in one of their regenerative cycles, 
which could eventually be self-corrected.166  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
[64]  Despite the divergence of jurisprudence and geographies of writers 
in this area, a common thread among them appears to be an implicit 
acceptance that despite how new, non-obvious, and useful a discovery or 
                                                 
163 A. Samuel Oddi, Regeneration in American Patent Law: Statutory Subject Matter, 46 
IDEA 491(2006). 
164 According to Oddi, there appears to be three identifiable jurisprudential periods in 
U.S. Law: a formative period arising from the ratification of the Constitution which 
lasted through the start of the Civil War, a formalistic period spanning the Civil War to 
somewhere between the World Wars, and a “modern” period following the end of the 
formalist era.  Id. at 495-96. 
165 Id. at 560. 
166 If Oddi is right, Metabolite may represent nothing more than a missed opportunity, 
rather than a presumed abandonment of a gatekeeping role.  See id. 
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development may be, there ought to be some “things” that fail the 
threshold of invention.  “Invention” is a flexible concept, designed to 
accommodate unforeseen advances in the practical application of human 
knowledge.  New advances in human understanding ought to expand 
acceptance of what constitutes an invention, not diminish it. 
